Brazilian Political Science Review (BPSR) is committed to the diffusion of high-work produced on topics of political science and international relations, thereby contributing to the exchange of ideas in the international political science community and the internationalization of scientific knowledge produced in Brazil.
Notice to Readers: All the datasets published by the Brazilian Political Science Review are available at: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/bpsr
Brazilian Political Science Review (BPSR) is committed to the diffusion of high-work produced on topics of political science and international relations, thereby contributing to the exchange of ideas in the international political science community and the internationalization of scientific knowledge produced in Brazil.
Notice to Readers: All the datasets published by the Brazilian Political Science Review are available at: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/bpsr
File Name: 1981-3821-bpsr-20-03-e0002-gf01
File Type: jpg
File Size: 31.44kB
Download30/Sep/2026
Luci Teston
, Matteo Manes
, Fabiano Santos
DOI: 10.1590/1981-3821202600030002
Abstract Research on subnational policy decision-making has revealed important institutional differences across Brazilian states. Yet these dynamics remain relatively understudied in Brazilian political science, where several federative units continue to be underrepresented. This research note examines Executive–Legislative relations in the state of Acre through the lens of theoretical typologies of interbranch interaction. The analysis covers 3,052 bills introduced between 2007 and 2022 across four legislative terms. Random-effects logistic regression models (GLMMs) are used to estimate the factors associated with bill […]
Keywords: electoral coalitions; Executive-Legislative relations; legislative bills; political parties; subnational politics
23/Nov/2016
DOI: 10.1590/1981-38212016000300001
Research on executive-legislative relations in presidential systems have emphasized how presidents use cabinet appointments to form and manage government coalitions in the absence of majority legislative support. Yet not all coalitions are similar, as some are larger and, consequently, more prone to agency and coordination problems than others. But what shapes presidents’ decision to include more parties in their coalitions? While several hypotheses exist in the literature, few have been tested in a systematic fashion, none focusing on why surplus […]
Keywords: Executive-Legislative relations; Government coalitions; Latin America; presidentialism