Brazilian Political Science Review (BPSR) is committed to the diffusion of high-work produced on topics of political science and international relations, thereby contributing to the exchange of ideas in the international political science community and the internationalization of scientific knowledge produced in Brazil.
Notice to Readers: All the datasets published by the Brazilian Political Science Review are available at: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/bpsr
Brazilian Political Science Review (BPSR) is committed to the diffusion of high-work produced on topics of political science and international relations, thereby contributing to the exchange of ideas in the international political science community and the internationalization of scientific knowledge produced in Brazil.
Notice to Readers: All the datasets published by the Brazilian Political Science Review are available at: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/bpsr
25/Apr/2018
DOI: 10.1590/1981-3821201800020001
This essay suggests a theory of strategic legislative agenda control. It argues that a single party can effectively set the agenda under majoritarian gatekeeping rules without obtaining majority or even plurality status. The agenda-setting party need not be the median party in the assembly nor supported by executive-led parliamentary coalitions. The Mexican Chamber of Deputies provides a case study of how majoritarian gatekeeping and political context establish the conditions necessary for one-party-led agenda-setting in a fragmented congress with or without […]
Keywords: agenda-setting; coalitions; Legislatures; Mexico; WNOMINATE