Brazilian Political Science Review (BPSR) is committed to the diffusion of high-work produced on topics of political science and international relations, thereby contributing to the exchange of ideas in the international political science community and the internationalization of scientific knowledge produced in Brazil.
Notice to Readers: All the datasets published by the Brazilian Political Science Review are available at: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/bpsr
Brazilian Political Science Review (BPSR) is committed to the diffusion of high-work produced on topics of political science and international relations, thereby contributing to the exchange of ideas in the international political science community and the internationalization of scientific knowledge produced in Brazil.
Notice to Readers: All the datasets published by the Brazilian Political Science Review are available at: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/bpsr
25/May/2023
Raul Bonfim
, Joyce Hellen Luz
, Vitor Vasquez
DOI: 10.1590/1981-3821202300020001
Until 2013, the Brazilian executive branch had control over the execution of all discretionary public spending. In that context, all Brazilian legislators could do was amend the budget proposal prepared by the government. This article analyzes whether EC 86/2015, known as the mandatory budget amendment EC, has reduced executive dominance over the financial cycle of individual budget amendments. To this end, we examine descriptively and inferentially the main changes proposed by EC 86/2015, as well as data about the individual […]
Keywords: coalitional presidentialism; executive branch; Federal budget; legislative branch; mandatory individual budget amendments