Brazilian Political Science Review (BPSR) is committed to the diffusion of high-work produced on topics of political science and international relations, thereby contributing to the exchange of ideas in the international political science community and the internationalization of scientific knowledge produced in Brazil.
Notice to Readers: All the datasets published by the Brazilian Political Science Review are available at: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/bpsr
Brazilian Political Science Review (BPSR) is committed to the diffusion of high-work produced on topics of political science and international relations, thereby contributing to the exchange of ideas in the international political science community and the internationalization of scientific knowledge produced in Brazil.
Notice to Readers: All the datasets published by the Brazilian Political Science Review are available at: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/bpsr
12/Sep/2011
DOI: 10.1590/1981-3888201100020002
Is there Executive interference in the regulatory agencies after its formal establishment as independent bodies? Under what conditions the Executive chooses to interfere in the agencies? This paper analyses the degree of interference in Brazilian national regulatory agencies and provide a tentative explanation for the variation in the degree of interference. The basic hypotheses is that credibility costs, the degree of formal independence and the preferences of presidents are crucial factors affecting the extent to which presidents interfere in the […]
Keywords: Delegation; independence; Political interference; Regulation