Brazilian Political Science Review (BPSR) is committed to the diffusion of high-work produced on topics of political science and international relations, thereby contributing to the exchange of ideas in the international political science community and the internationalization of scientific knowledge produced in Brazil.
Notice to Readers: All the datasets published by the Brazilian Political Science Review are available at: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/bpsr
Brazilian Political Science Review (BPSR) is committed to the diffusion of high-work produced on topics of political science and international relations, thereby contributing to the exchange of ideas in the international political science community and the internationalization of scientific knowledge produced in Brazil.
Notice to Readers: All the datasets published by the Brazilian Political Science Review are available at: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/bpsr
01/Jun/2014
Marcello Fragano Baird, Ivan Filipe de Almeida Lopes Fernandes
DOI: 10.1590/1981-38212014000100012
Regulatory agencies possess the particularity of being controlled by non-elected politicians whose power is derived from delegations made by incumbent powers. There exists, however, a concern with the creation of institutional mechanisms that permit public participation, thus guaranteeing greater democratization and social control of the regulatory process. One of these participatory mechanisms is the public hearing, which was not given much attention by Brazilian literature on lobbying and interest groups. This article seeks to contribute to fill this gap, focusing […]
Keywords: ANAC; lobby; Public hearing; regulatory agencies; social participation