The term ‘Center of Government’ is commonly associated with the literature on public administration, though different authors and theoretical traditions have conceptualized it in varying ways. In this study, the structure under examination aligns with what is termed the ‘core executive’ in the British context and the ‘institutional presidency’ in the American one. The literature also employs related expressions such as ‘presidential core executive’ and ‘presidential center’.

The scholarly literature on the Center of Government first emerged in the American and British contexts, driven by distinct objectives but rooted in a shared historical moment that underscored the importance of this subject of study. As Guedes Neto (2021) notes, the relevance of the CoG to Political Science and Public Administration became particularly evident after the two World Wars, when the number of units surrounding heads of government expanded in both presidential and parliamentary systems. This expansion also strengthened the institutional capacity of the Executive Branch. In this context, examining the CoG’s decision-making processes within the Executive help us better understand the strategies through which governments pursue their political and policy agendas, often with direct implications for society (FAWCETT and GAY, 2005).

The political influence of the CoG varies according to each country’s institutional design, political context, and administrative culture. Generally, however, it involves the capacity for interministerial coordination, long-term strategic planning, and effective crisis management. In multiparty systems, the CoG may also serve as the central hub for managing the government’s relationships with coalition partners.

Amid this wide range of theoretical approaches, Alessandro, Lafuente, and Santiso (2013) identify two main conceptual perspectives in the literature on the structure of the Center of Government. The ‘narrow perspective’ defines the CoG as the set of bodies existing solely within the formal structure of the presidency, dedicated to providing direct support to the head of government – a view generally associated with the American literature (MOE, 1985). In contrast, the ‘broad perspective’ conceives the CoG as a hybrid arrangement that includes other executive bodies beyond those directly linked to the head of government, which may perform typical CoG functions such as coordinating and monitoring the government’s priority policies - a view commonly associated with the British literature (RHODES, 1995).

From the American perspective, authors such as Moe (1985) and Rudalevige and Lewis (2005) examine the process of institutionalizing units around the president, as well as a recurring dilemma in the literature concerning centralization versus politicization. This dilemma reflects the strategies through which the head of government exercises power and manages relationships. Centralization is characterized by concentrating autonomy and responsibilities within bodies directly under the president’s hierarchy, typically staffed by loyalists and members of the president’s own party. In contrast, politicization refers to a strategy that involves both co-opting the bureaucracy to support the president and allocating positions and responsibilities to allies who are not necessarily from the same party. This debate is central in the literature insofar as it addresses how presidents structure the administrative and political apparatus to advance their agendas.

In more recent studies of the American case, authors such as Cohen and Hult (2020), Moynihan and Roberts (2010) examine both the presidential styles of specific administrations, such as those of George W. Bush and Donald Trump, and the dynamics of centralization and politicization strategies and their effects on the presidential agenda. In this regard, the literature identifies a recurring pattern in CoG studies, whether from the British or American perspective: within a single presidential administration, executive bodies may assume different roles and responsibilities, causing the agenda to shift depending on whether centralization or politicization prevails. This variation reflects the president’s own approach, as research shows that presidential style shapes the allocation of responsibilities across organizations in line with the president’s individual and political priorities.

In the British context, the concept of the Core Executive closely parallels the approach found in Brazilian and Latin American literature on the Center of Government. The Core Executive refers to the set of ministerial cabinet structures and departmental units involved in decision-making on issues deemed priorities by the prime minister. Its primary difference from the American approach lies in its broader scope. Within the Core Executive tradition, a commonly used methodological perspective is the expanded view of the CoG, which incorporates units not necessarily directly linked to the prime minister’s hierarchy. This distinction, first introduced by Rhodes (1995), remains central to differentiating the American and British methodological approaches: while the American literature primarily seeks to explain the expansion or contraction of units within the CoG, the British literature focuses on understanding the formal and informal functions of these units, often employing descriptive statistical analyses, sometimes combined with interviews.

Despite their methodological differences, studies in both contexts analyze similar institutional units. As noted earlier, the literature emphasizes the strategies that heads of government may adopt to centralize or share decision-making power. Within the Core Executive tradition, these approaches seek to explain how governments are organized, with particular attention to the distribution of power, budgetary capacities, and the administrative and political functions of individual units (PETERS, RHODES, and WRIGHT, 2000).

Over the past decade, research on the Center of Government in Latin America has expanded significantly. In a study assessing the state of the field in the region, Bonvecchi and Scartascini (2011) observe that presidents are supported by advisors. Who report directly to them and, do not necessarily hold formal departmental responsibilities. These characteristics are typical of the presidential office, commonly referred to as the ‘Presidential Center’.

In 2013, Alessandro, Lafuente, and Santiso reviewed the literature on the Center of Government up to that time, defining it as: “The institution or group of institutions that provide direct support to the country’s chief executive, generally for the political and technical coordination of government actions, strategic planning, performance monitoring, and communication of the government’s decisions and achievements”. (ALESSANDRO, LAFUENTE, and SANTISO, 2013, p. 04).

Using an approach that tests hypotheses about the expansion of the CoG in coalition presidential systems, Inácio and Llanos (2015) draw on the concepts of the institutional presidency (MOE, 1993, apud INÁCIO and LLANOS, 2015) and the core executive (PETERS et al., 2000, apud INÁCIO and LLANOS, 2015). To describe the set of units or agencies that provide direct support to the chief executive and to test hypotheses concerning the effects of political-context variables on the expansion or contraction of what they term the institutional presidency. The authors argue that the number of units within the executive bureaucracy operating under the president’s direct hierarchy and tasked with providing direct support may vary depending on the number of parties in the cabinet and the president’s relationship with the National Congress, particularly the lower house.

Cavalcante and Gomide (2018), in turn, adopt an approach more closely aligned with the Core Executive to analyze Brazilian presidential administrations from 1995 to 2014, showing how the roles and composition of units vary in response to the challenges faced by each president and the broader political and socioeconomic context. Cavalcante (2018) refers to these units as the ‘Núcleo de Governo’ (Government Core), a set of institutions that provide direct support to the head of the Executive Branch. Whether formally established or informally organized, these institutions are charged with managing government operations, coordinating policies, and steering strategic priorities across successive administrations.

From a Core Executive–inspired perspective, the volume edited by Cavalcante and Gomide (2018) brings together a series of articles that examine the functions historically performed by agencies within the CoG, including those housed in the ministries of the ‘Esplanada’, the palace ministries, and units located within the president’s hierarchical structure.

In the same volume, Cavalcante and Batista (2018) emphasize the need for clearly defined CoG models to support precise conceptual and measurement criteria for the study subject, and they offer alternative terminology for the categories outlined earlier. According to the authors, the narrow perspective identified by Alessandro, Lafuente, and Santiso (2013) – which they characterize as ‘structural’ – is closely associated with the study of the specific functions of the units closest to the presidency. The expanded perspective, in turn – which they characterize as ‘functional’ – broadens the analytical scope by situating the CoG within the broader context of public administration and public policy.

Another way to analyze CoGs is by distinguishing between the ‘de jure’ and ‘de facto’ dimensions that shape decision-making dynamics. Cavalcante and Batista (2018) argue that understanding the role of institutions within the CoG from this perspective requires combining a document-based analysis, which captures the formal (‘de jure’) structure, with a mapping of interactions recorded in the president’s public schedule, which reveals the informal (‘de facto’) dynamics that are not necessarily documented or institutionalized.

In day-to-day operations, several studies identify the Casa Civil as a key institution for coordinating internal relations within the Executive Branch. Cavalcante, Gomide, and Barbosa (2018) characterize the Casa Civil as a ‘negative coordination’ body, acting as a mediator of conflicts among ministries. Lopez, Silva, and Borges (2018) underscore its role in the dual formation of the agenda, noting that the Casa Civil is responsible for managing and reconciling the priorities originating from both the ministries and the presidency.

The body of literature that this study engages in direct dialogue with. In our analysis, we draw on both the structural and functional perspectives of the CoG, as our goal is to capture the full range of dynamics across different CoG configurations – specifically, the units with which President Bolsonaro interacted and the extent to which their formal status aligns with typical CoG functions. Methodologically, engaging with this literature is warranted insofar as our objective is to analyze and describe the functions performed by public administration bodies. This approach contrasts with the institutional presidency perspective discussed earlier, in which hypotheses are tested by treating presidential units as dependent variables.

In this context, our study draws on Cavalcante and Batista’s (2018) perspective on the ‘Núcleo de Governo’, which enables an analysis based on a methodology adapted from the Core Executive framework to the Brazilian setting: a political system marked by multipartysm, in which presidents cannot secure a congressional majority without support from multiple parties. This analytical approach makes it possible to describe which bodies composed the formal and informal CoG and to explore potential explanations for the president’s adoption of different CoG configurations over the course of the term.

The limitation of this approach lies in its inability to test explanatory hypotheses – namely, to evaluate the strength of associations between variables. Even so, it offers a more detailed view of the internal decision-making environment within Bolsonaro’s CoG by capturing the informal dynamics emphasized by the functional perspective, which are not always visible in the formal CoG configuration. Within this framework, the study aims to understand the internal dynamics of Bolsonaro’s Center of Government, an arrangement the literature characterizes as atypical and one that, over the course of his term, had to navigate a global crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, while addressing the research question that guides this work.

Given the atypical nature of Bolsonaro’s administration, it is important to compare it with the administrations examined by Cavalcante and Batista (2018) (Fernando Henrique Cardoso I and II, Lula I and II, and Dilma I). In order to identify the key differences between a Center of Government shaped by a far-right ideological alignment and an anti-system platform, as noted by Borges and Vidigal (2023), and those of its predecessors.

In this section, we apply the collected data using the framework developed by Cavalcante and Batista (2018) across the four CoG models: 01. structural de jure CoG, 02. functional de jure CoG, 03. structural de facto CoG, and 04. functional de facto CoG. We then compare these CoG configurations under Bolsonaro with those of FHC I and II, Lula I and II, and Dilma I. It is important to note that Cavalcante and Batista (2018) included only administrations that completed uninterrupted terms, as CoG configurations can vary from year to year. The shorter duration of Dilma II and Temer’s governments makes them less suitable for comparison.

This section presents the structural de jure organization of Bolsonaro’s Center of Government. Within this framework, we analyze all units included in the presidency’s organizational chart. This structure encompasses bodies with cross-cutting coordination functions, i.e., functions that affect the entire executive branch, such as the Casa Civil, as well as advisory bodies, including the Special Advisory Office of the President (CAVALCANTE and BATISTA, 2018).

According to Cavalcante and Batista (2018), beginning with FHC’s second term, the Center of Government experienced a notable strengthening of its public policy coordination functions. Presidents FHC, Lula, and Dilma added thematic secretariats to the formal presidential structure, including the Secretariat for Urban Development and the Secretariat of Ports. The number of units within the presidential structure also expanded, rising from seven in FHC I to thirteen in FHC II and Lula I, and reaching fifteen in Lula II and Dilma I, excluding the deliberative councils. The authors interpret this expansion as a consolidation of the president’s authority to steer and control the policy agenda.

During Bolsonaro’s administration, the presidential structure experienced a slight reduction, though the number of units remained relatively stable, rising from 14 units in 2019–2020 to 15 in 2020–2021, before returning to 14 in 2022. Unlike his predecessors, Bolsonaro did not introduce any thematic secretariats into the presidential structure, which might have signaled a prioritization of specific public policies. The Investment Partnerships Program Council was formally part of the presidential structure, but it convened only 17 times over the four-year term, according to the president’s official schedule. The Chart 01below lists all units within the presidential structure during Bolsonaro’s government.

Chart 01

Bodies linked to the Presidential Structure
Palace Ministries and Secretariats	Commissions and Councils
Casa Civil Secretariat of Government General Secretariat of the Presidency Personal Office of the President Institutional Security Bureau National Data Protection Authority (until 2022) Attorney General’s Office Special Advisory Office of the President Special Secretariat for Strategic Affairs (as of 2020)	Public Ethics Commission Council of Government National Council on Energy Policy Council of the Republic National Defense Council Investment Partnerships Program Council

Source: Elaborated by the authors based on the laws and decrees governing the units.

As of February 2020, the Special Secretariat for Strategic Affairs (SAE) began reporting directly to the Presidency under Decree Nº 10,244/2020 (BRAZIL, 2020). The SAE took over the functions previously performed by the Special Advisory Office of the President, supporting the President in conducting studies and engaging with foreign organizations. Following the framework outlined by Cavalcante and Batista (2018), the SAE is tasked with coordinating national strategic planning and overseeing strategic programs and projects.

Within the Casa Civil, the Special Advisory Office and the Office of Coordination and Monitoring played a key role in coordinating ministries and secretariats in the development of the president’s ‘priority projects’, as outlined in Decree Nº 9,678/19. Responsibility for setting the budgetary priorities of these projects fell to the Special Secretariat for Government Relations, working alongside the aforementioned Office of Coordination and Monitoring. In a similar budgetary capacity, the Secretariat of Institutional Relations within the General Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic oversaw and evaluated the mandatory execution of funds allocated through parliamentary amendments.

Additionally, Decree Nº 9,979/19 amended Decree Nº 9,678/19 (BRAZIL, 2019a) to designate the Casa Civil as an evaluative body responsible for monitoring government actions and overseeing the management of public administration entities. The Casa Civil was also tasked with coordinating and supervising other ministries in the development of projects and public policies, at least to the extent provided by law.

In terms of relations with the National Congress, both the Casa Civil and the Secretariat of Government (SEGOV) were assigned this responsibility under the legislation governing the Presidency’s structure, through laws or presidential decrees. In the case of SEGOV, this responsibility was shared with the Casa Civil and coordinated with the Secretariat for Federal Affairs as specified in Decree Nº 9,980 of August, 20 (BRAZIL, 2019c).

This section examines the functional perspective to identify the agencies that perform typical Center of Government roles, even if they lie outside the president’s immediate hierarchical structure. These agencies operate transversally across the executive branch to advance the president’s priorities in practice, with their responsibilities defined by law. For this analysis, we constructed the dataset using the descriptors outlined in the Data and Methodology section.

While our focus remains on the defined set of descriptors, one noteworthy competency is that of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJUSP) in advising the president on matters beyond its own ministerial portfolio. Although this ministry does not meet the specified descriptors, this role may reflect the president’s particular interest in the MJUSP or the level of trust he placed in it. Additionally, as Batista (2018) observes, the MJUSP was among the most influential ministries in shaping the executive agenda in previous administrations, a pattern that may have continued under Bolsonaro.

The charts 02 and 03 below summarize the units classified under the functional de jure perspective, as well as those that fall outside this classification.

Chart 02

Functional De Jure CoG of the Bolsonaro Administration (2019–2022)
Palace Ministries: 1. Casa Civil 2. Secretariat of Government 3. General Secretariat of the Presidency
Special Secretariats: 4. Special Secretariat for Strategic Affairs (as of 2020) 5. Special Secretariat for Social Communication of the Secretariat of Government of the Presidency of the Republic (until 2021) 6. Secretariat of Institutional Communication of the Ministry of Communications (as of 2022)
Advisory Offices and Councils: 7. Attorney General’s Office 8. Council of Government 9. Special Advisory Office of the President 10. Council of the Republic 11. Office of the Comptroller General
Esplanada Ministries: 12. Ministry of Economy 13. Ministry of Infrastructure 14. Ministry of Citizenship

Source: Elaborated by the authors based on the laws and decrees governing the units.

Chart 03

Bodies within the Presidential Structure

Esplanada Ministries

Personal Office of the President Institutional Security Bureau Public Ethics Commission National Data Protection Authority (until 2022) National Council on Energy Policy Council of the Republic National Defense Council Investment Partnerships Program Council

Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovation, and Communications Ministry of Defense Ministry of Regional Development Ministry of Education Ministry of Justice and Public Security Ministry of the Environment Ministry of Mines and Energy Ministry of Women, Family, and Human Rights Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Health Ministry of Tourism Ministry of Communications (as of 2021) Ministry of Labor and Social Security (as of 2021)

Source: Elaborated by the authors based on the laws and decrees governing the units.

A key preliminary observation is that some advisory units within the presidential structure do not perform typical Center of Government functions and are therefore excluded from the formal de jure CoG classification. Conversely, certain ministries do carry out CoG responsibilities despite not being formally part of the presidential structure, that is, they perform CoG functions without being directly linked to the president. In general, units responsible for cross-cutting coordination and oversight remained within our classification, consistent with the patterns identified by Cavalcante and Batista (2018) for the FHC, Lula, and Dilma administrations.

The inclusion of the Ministry of Economy in the functional de jure CoG is justified not only because it appears prominently across the descriptors but, more importantly, because its control over resources for policy implementation and fiscal management affects the entire Executive Branch (CAVALCANTE and BATISTA, 2018). It is also worth noting that this ministry inherited the responsibilities of the former Ministries of Finance and Planning, both of which were typically part of the functional de jure CoG in previous administrations.

Compared with earlier administrations, Cavalcante and Batista (2018) show that the functional de jure CoG expanded under FHC as the size of the presidential office grew. In contrast, the Lula and Dilma administrations reduced the functional de jure CoG by creating a larger number of secretariats dedicated to specific public policy areas within the presidential structure. As a result, the expansion of units inside the presidency reflected a shift toward policy-specific bodies rather than a growth in units performing typical CoG functions.

During the Bolsonaro administration, the president did not create thematic secretariats as Lula and Dilma had, although infrastructure and citizenship were incorporated into the functional de jure CoG. Bolsonaro retained many coordination bodies but did not establish the thematic secretariats typical of earlier CoGs, which resulted in the largest number of functional de jure CoG units of any administration – 14 in total, most of which dedicated to cross-cutting coordination. Previously, Lula had the highest number, with 12 units in his first term. Whether Temer followed a similar pattern remains an open question, as this study examines only uninterrupted four-year administrations. The Chart 04 below compares the functional de jure CoG units from FHC I through Dilma I and Bolsonaro.

Chart 04

.
FHC I	FHC II	Lula I
Attorney General’s Office Casa Civil General Secretariat of the Presidency Secretariat for Strategic Affairs Secretariat of Social Communication Council of Government Ministry of Planning, Budget and Coordination Ministry of Finance	Attorney General’s Office Casa Civil Secretariat of Institutional Relations Extraordinary Minister of State for Special Projects State Secretariat for Government Communication Council of Government Office of the Comptroller General Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management Ministry of Finance	Attorney General’s Office Casa Civil General Secretariat of the Presidency Secretariat of Institutional Relations Special Advisory Office of the President Secretariat of Government Communication and Strategic Management Secretariat of Press and Spokesperson Council of Government Economic and Social Development Council Office of the Comptroller General Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management Ministry of Finance
Lula II	Dilma I	Bolsonaro
Attorney General’s Office Casa Civil General Secretariat of the Presidency Secretariat of Institutional Relations Special Advisory Office of the President Secretariat of Social Communication Council of Government Secretariat for Strategic Affairs Office of the Comptroller General Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management Ministry of Finance	Attorney General’s Office Casa Civil General Secretariat of the Presidency Secretariat of Institutional Relations Special Advisory Office of the President Secretariat of Social Communication Council of Government Secretariat for Strategic Affairs Office of the Comptroller General Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management Ministry of Finance	Attorney General’s Office Casa Civil Secretariat of Government General Secretariat of the Presidency Council of Government Special Advisory Office of the President Council of the Republic Special Secretariat for Strategic Affairs Office of the Comptroller General Ministry of Economy Ministry of Infrastructure Ministry of Citizenship Special Secretariat for Social Communication of the Secretariat of Government of the Presidency of the Republic Secretariat of Institutional Communication of the Ministry of Communications

Source: For the FHC I to Dilma I administrations, Cavalcante and Batista (2018, p. 74). For the Bolsonaro administration, elaborated by the authors based on presidential legislation.

Furthermore, these findings indicate a convergence between the first period of Bolsonaro’s administration and Vieira’s (2017) observation: presidents whose ideological positions are more extreme relative to their governing coalition tend to centralize power within the CoG and maintain a larger number of units directly under their control. In Bolsonaro’s case – and this will be examined in more detail later – he maintained a functional de jure CoG with a slightly higher number of units compared to other recent presidents. The key difference is that, although it is debatable whether he ever truly built a formal coalition, a form of political alliance – particularly with the Progressive Party (Partido Progressista, PP) and the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal, PL) – only took shape in the second half of his term, following the appointments of Ciro Nogueira to the Casa Civil and Flávia Arruda to the Secretariat of Government. Even with this pragmatic political alignment, and as a president at the far right of the ideological spectrum, Bolsonaro did not further centralize decision-making within the CoG; instead, he shared it with a small political group while maintaining his position at the extreme end of the spectrum.

This section examines the interactions between the President and the units within the structural Center of Government. Analyzing the president’s official schedule allows us to capture day-to-day activities, within the limits of formal records, since some meetings may not have taken place and others may not have been officially documented, and are therefore not included in our dataset. Nonetheless, this approach makes it possible to identify which units were genuinely closest to the president in the decision-making process, going beyond what is visible from the formal/legal perspective. While the specific topics of these meetings are not always known, the data indicate the relative level of involvement of each unit in the president’s decision-making (CAVALCANTE and BATISTA, 2018).

Comparing Bolsonaro’s interactions with those of previous administrations – specifically FHC and Dilma, recalling that public schedule records are unavailable for Lula I and II – Cavalcante and Batista (2018) observe that both presidents maintained a high volume of interactions with the Casa Civil (CC), far exceeding those with other bodies. In FHC I, 66.7% of interactions involved the CC, followed by the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs with 11%. During FHC II, 37.5% of interactions involved the CC, with the General Secretariat ranking second at 25%. In Dilma I, meetings with the CC accounted for 38% of interactions, followed by the Secretariat of Communication at 14.6%.

As shown in the Graph 01 below, Bolsonaro met with the Secretariat of Government in 26.6% of recorded interactions, the Casa Civil in 24.01%, the General Secretariat of the Presidency in 19.6%, and the Institutional Security Bureau (GSI) in 14.7%. Despite these differences, we found that interactions involving the GSI, the SEGOV, and the Casa Civil frequently included other ministries, underscoring their coordinating role within the executive. Additionally, the SEGOV retained responsibility for managing relations with the National Congress, which may explain the increase in interactions over the years.

Graph 01 Source: Elaborated by the authors based on data from the president’s public schedule. *Acronym Key: SEGOV – Secretariat of Government; CC – Casa Civil; SG – General Secretariat; GSI – Institutional Security Bureau; AGU – Attorney General’s Office; CGU – Office of the Comptroller General; CONSEGOV – Council of Government; GP – Personal Office of the President; ASSESP – Special Advisory Office of the President; SAE – Secretariat of Strategic Affairs; ANPD – National Data Protection Authority; CONSEDN - National Defense Council.

In the first two years of Bolsonaro’s term, the GSI recorded 168 interactions in 2019 and 161 in 2020. In 2021 and 2022, however, the number of meetings dropped sharply to 43 and 07, respectively. Even so, Bolsonaro interacted far more frequently with the GSI than his predecessors. For FHC, interactions with the bureau appeared only during his second term (6.5%), while for Dilma they represented just 0.6% of meetings with other structural CoG bodies. Throughout his presidency, Bolsonaro often met with the GSI alongside the Ministry of Defense and the heads of the armed forces, reflecting the prominent role of the military in his administration.

Cavalcante and Batista (2018) show that FHC maintained a lean structural de facto CoG, involving only five to six bodies, whereas Dilma interacted with fifteen. Bolsonaro falls closer to the average, with twelve bodies in the structural de facto CoG. The main distinguishing feature of his term is the intense interaction with the GSI and the comparatively limited engagement with the Casa Civil relative to his predecessors. The Attorney General’s Office (AGU) also stands out: although it did not appear in FHC’s list and accounted for only 4.2% of interactions under Dilma, it ranked fifth under Bolsonaro, with 8.2%. Given the AGU’s key role in providing legal counsel and navigating institutional crises, the agency was crucial in mitigating procedural risks.

Furthermore, a comparison of the president’s interactions with CoG bodies versus the broader ministerial cabinet shows that, over time, although presidents tend to meet more frequently with ministries outside the CoG. Simply due to their larger number – the share of interactions involving the structural de facto CoG has grown, rising from 10% under FHC I to 30% under Dilma I (CAVALCANTE and BATISTA, 2018). Under Bolsonaro, this proportion increased further to 41.7%, indicating a notable shift in the pattern of interactions between CoG and non-CoG ministries compared to previous administrations.

This section analyzes the president’s interactions with the bodies previously classified as part of the functional de facto Center of Government. The goal is to identify which units the president actually engaged with in practice, regardless of their formal position within the presidential structure or the presence of descriptors in official regulations. In this sense, the record of meetings helps reveal which units were truly central to the decision-making process.

During Bolsonaro’s administration, the functional CoG was highly concentrated. The president’s public schedule shows that security and defense ranked among the government’s top priorities, with the Ministry of Defense appearing frequently among the bodies he met with most often – even though it was not formally part of the CoG, as discussed later. Although the substance of these meetings is not publicly disclosed, the GSI’s responsibilities, especially its role in crisis management, underscore its importance during this period, particularly throughout the pandemic.

In the final two years of Bolsonaro’s term, however, interactions between the president and the GSI declined, even relative to units outside the CoG. This pattern reflects the president’s growing focus on the 2022 general elections and the increasing involvement of his political allies in government. As a result, 2021 and 2022 recorded the lowest number of entries in the president’s public schedule, as examined further below.

During the FHC and Dilma administrations, the Casa Civil played a central role in coordinating ministerial policies, consistently ranking as the most or second most frequently consulted body. Under Bolsonaro, the Casa Civil remained among the units the president met with most often, but the overall volume of interactions was significantly lower than in previous administrations. This pattern suggests that Bolsonaro may have adopted a different strategy in how he engaged with the Casa Civil.

In comparative terms, and consistent with previous administrations, the Casa Civil has historically performed two central roles across the governments from FHC’s first term through Dilma Rousseff’s first: coordinating government actions and overseeing as well as executing the Presidency’s administrative activities (LAMEIRÃO, 2018). These responsibilities continued under Bolsonaro. However, the Casa Civil gained greater autonomy after the publication of Decrees Nº 10,907 and 10,967 in 2021. It was during this period that Bolsonaro appointed Senator Ciro Nogueira (PP–PI) as Chief of Staff of the Casa Civil. In an effort to strengthen political alliances with parties beyond the one he would eventually join – the Liberal Party (PL) – after a succession of Chiefs of Staff drawn primarily from the military wing of his administration.

These decrees explicitly reorganized the Casa Civil in ways that expanded its autonomy over government coordination. As stated in Decree Nº 10,967: “Art. 23-B. It is the responsibility of the Casa Civil of the Presidency of the Republic to coordinate discussions aimed at resolving disputes between agencies regarding the substance of proposed regulatory acts”. This authority had not been granted in previous administrations, strengthening the argument that the Casa Civil under Bolsonaro gained substantial autonomy – at least on paper. The Chart 05 below summarizes the decrees that defined and redefined the Casa Civil’s responsibilities during Bolsonaro’s administration.

Chart 05

Decree Nº	Date	Main Changes
9,678	January 02, 2019	Established the initial organizational structure of the Casa Civil under the Bolsonaro administration, defining responsibilities such as direct support to the President, coordination of ministerial activities, and administrative oversight of the Presidency.
9,696	March 08, 2019	Transferred the responsibilities of the Investment Partnerships Program (PPI) to the PPI Special Secretariat within the Ministry of the Economy and reorganized the Casa Civil’s internal structure.
10,907	December 20, 2021	Approved a new organizational framework that expanded the Casa Civil’s role in coordinating and integrating government actions. Created new administrative units to strengthen coordination among ministries and presidential offices and reallocated political appointments and trust positions.
10,967	March 11, 2022	Expanded the Casa Civil’s authority to coordinate discussions and resolve disputes among agencies regarding proposed regulatory acts, and assigned it a role in mediating and proposing solutions directly to the President. The decree also refined the Casa Civil’s internal structure for coordinating government policies.

Source: Elaborated by the authors based on the decrees regulating the Casa Civil of the Presidency of the Republic.

In the case of the Secretariat of Government, Bolsonaro’s interactions with this office spiked in 2020 – the only year in which more than 300 meetings were recorded, compared to fewer than 200 in all other years. This sharp increase may be explained, at least in part, by the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting need to secure congressional approval for an unusually large volume of bills and provisional measures³. Under Decree Nº 9,980 of August 20, 2019 (Art. 01, I, ‘c’ and ‘f’), the Secretariat of Government was formally responsible for political coordination and relations with the National Congress, serving as the main institutional channel for these negotiations.

In a related development, the Secretariat for Legal Affairs (SAJ) — originally housed within the Casa Civil and responsible for drafting all regulatory acts and legislative proposals submitted to Congress — was transferred to the General Secretariat in August, 2019. However, it was only from late 2020 onward that the president began to treat the SAJ as a priority advisory body. By 2022, it had become the office with which Bolsonaro met most frequently, both within and outside the CoG.

We now turn to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) and the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJUSP). Fits neither the structural or functional ‘de jure’ classifications of the Center of Government due to the absence of predefined criteria. In the case of the MRE, despite its controversial foreign policy agenda, characterized by a strong alignment with the United States and a prioritized bilateral approach, as noted by Vidigal (2019), the OECD (2022) classifies it as part of the CoG due to its role in coordinating foreign policy. After the Ministry of the Economy, the MRE was the ministry Bolsonaro visited most frequently within the ‘Esplanada’.

Regarding the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJUSP), although legislation authorizes the ministry to advise the president on matters that extend beyond its formal domain, it does not clearly define what that advisory role entails. For this reason, we did not use this descriptor as a criterion for classifying the MJUSP as part of the CoG, as our study adheres strictly to the methodology proposed by Cavalcante and Batista (2018). Even so, the MJUSP was among the ten agencies that met most frequently with the president. Public security, the anti-corruption agenda, and especially the pro-gun platform were central themes of Bolsonaro’s 2018 campaign. Based on Bolsonaro’s interactions with the MJUSP and his campaign commitments, we conclude that these issues were treated as priorities. As De Toni (2018) shows, campaign commitments have a significant impact on shaping a president’s CoG priorities.

The CoG is also known to shift during periods of crisis. In Bolsonaro’s case, however, despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the agencies that interacted most frequently with the president in 2020 remained largely the same, with differences appearing mainly in the number of meetings. The Ministry of Health, for example, held 52 meetings with the president in 2020 and 54 in 2021, compared to just 15 in 2019. However, ministries such as the Ministry of Mines and Energy and the Ministry of Education, which were not central to crisis management, recorded as many – or even more – meetings than the Ministry of Health during the pandemic. The belated creation of the COVID-19 Coordination and Response Committee in 2021 resulted in only seven meetings, underscoring Bolsonaro’s limited engagement in pandemic response efforts.

Finally, we compared the president’s interactions with the functional de facto CoG to his interactions with the rest of the ministerial cabinet. In the earlier analysis of the structural de facto CoG, these interactions represented 33.37% of the total; in the present comparison, the share increases to 58.2%. This is higher than the level observed during Dilma Rousseff’s first term (45%) but higher than during FHC’s first and second terms (20%). The substantial volume of interactions with transversal agencies suggests an ongoing institutionalization of decision-making processes through the coordination roles performed by these bodies (CAVALCANTE and BATISTA, 2018).

To contextualize the day-to-day functioning of the CoG, Silva (2015) notes that under Lula, the Casa Civil operated much like an executive secretariat to the Presidency. As in Dilma’s administration, Lula relied on inputs produced by the Office of Coordination and Monitoring within the Casa Civil to guide decision-making and took an active role in this process. In both the Lula and Dilma governments, the Casa Civil functioned primarily as an advisory and supervisory body, playing a central role in evaluating, monitoring, and coordinating government initiatives.

Our analysis shows that Decree Nº 9,678/19, which established the structure of Bolsonaro’s Casa Civil, largely preserved the office’s traditional emphasis on government management. In addition to these customary functions, however, Bolsonaro’s Casa Civil took on a more assertive role in coordinating ministerial political affairs, at times overlapping with the Secretariat of Government in managing relations with Congress. Its autonomy expanded further with the normative acts issued in 2021, even when compared with earlier administrations. Bolsonaro entrusted Ciro Nogueira’s Casa Civil with the authority to act as the final arbiter in inter-ministerial disputes, granting it broad powers to steer the other ministries and a degree of independence not observed in previous governments.

The Casa Civil undoubtedly played a central coordinating role within the CoG’s management framework. It assessed the relevance of each priority project and engaged with the appropriate ministries whenever necessary. For instance, if a ministry identified the need for funding for an infrastructure project, the Casa Civil could bring the Ministry of Economy into the process to secure financial resources and, should legal issues arise, work through the Secretariat for Legal Affairs to resolve them, in line with the decree outlining its responsibilities. This coordination might include, for example, drafting a budget amendment in partnership with SEGOV to facilitate its approval by the National Congress.

In the early years of his presidency, Bolsonaro attempted to govern without a clearly defined legislative base and struggled to advance his proposals, especially in the economic arena. For example, the pension reform was driven by congressional initiative rather than coordinated by the executive. During the pandemic, Bolsonaro’s governing style shifted to one centered on media visibility. Lacking a clear agenda of his own, he increasingly adopted a reactive posture, often attributing both his inaction and the federal government’s difficulties in coordinating pandemic responses to the Supreme Federal Court’s decision allowing states and municipalities to exercise autonomy in these matters. Nevertheless, this ruling in no way precluded the federal government from formulating its own crisis-management policy agenda - an initiative that, notably, never materialized.

In the final two years of his term, 2021 and 2022, after forging alliances with several parties and individual politicians, the president began sharing his agenda with actors who had joined his support coalition. This shift enabled a more pragmatic approach to policymaking and congressional negotiations (CRUZ and SILVA, 2023). Prior to this, as Inácio (2021) argues, Bolsonaro had pursued a radical politicization of the Executive, targeting ministries whose agendas clashed with his own – an approach that did not entirely disappear in the later years of his presidency. For the new allies who joined him in 2021 and 2022, he granted the same level of autonomy previously afforded to ideologically aligned ministers, placing two of them in key CoG agencies: Ciro Nogueira at the Casa Civil and Flávia Arruda at the Secretariat of Government.

In this regard, Bolsonaro represents an unusual case in the broader debate on centralization versus politicization within studies of the Center of Government. This is because, in the existing literature, there is no evidence that his administration engaged in any pragmatic coalition-building effort. At the same time, as part of a political survival strategy, he began, according to Medeiros (2022), to negotiate on an ad hoc basis with certain parties and individual politicians. In doing so, he even allocated CoG positions to two figures who were not his political allies – a move that could be interpreted as a form of cabinet politicization. However, the absence of a clearly defined coalition makes such an interpretation difficult to sustain.

In 2019 and 2020, before these ministers took office, military officers who, lacking political experience, struggled to negotiate with Congress had occupied those positions. Once new parties joined the government, Bolsonaro granted their appointees considerable autonomy, which in turn shaped their policy agendas. In 2021, the number of meetings and events declined relative to 2019 and 2020, and in 2022 we observe the lowest levels recorded, as shown in the graph below, even though some reduction is expected in an election year.

Below, we present another Graph 07 comparing year-to-year meeting frequencies among the functional CoG bodies. In 2022, activity within the CoG was driven primarily by the Secretariat for Legal Affairs, a particularly relevant body given its role in providing legal counsel to the president. Its heightened involvement contributed to a more pragmatic approach to drafting legislative and regulatory proposals and to managing relations with Congress at the end of the term. By contrast, the other CoG bodies saw a decline in activity between 2021 and 2022.

Graph 07 Source: Elaborated by the authors based on data from the president’s public schedule.

In summary, our analysis of the Center of Government during the Bolsonaro administration reveals a significant shift both in its formal configuration and in the president’s interaction patterns compared with earlier administrations. Formally, the most striking feature is the absence of thematic secretariats. In terms of interactions, the most prominent finding is the unusually low level of engagement with the Casa Civil. The reasons behind these management choices warrant further investigation in future research drawing on additional data. Although previous studies highlight the Casa Civil’s longstanding role in interministerial coordination and mediation, it was only under Bolsonaro that institutional arbitration was explicitly codified as part of its formal responsibilities. Furthermore, while the incorporation of new parties (PP and PL) brought greater pragmatism and flexibility to the administration, this period also coincided with a noticeable decline in Bolsonaro’s institutional engagement, as reflected in the sharp drop in official commitments on his public schedule.