

## Appendix A1

**Table A1.** Models with extra-legislative Controls

	Model A Correct (excludes abstentions)	Model B Correct (abstentions = yes)
Log distance	-0.13* (.07)	-0.11** (.04)
(Avg) Absent	-2.61** (1.25)	-1.36** (.59)
Log distance X (Avg) Absent	.46** (.20)	.21** (.10)
Year of election (>1910 = 1)	-.20* (.11)	-.21** (.10)
Urbanization	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)
Landholding inequality (Gini)	-.47 (.66)	-.46 (.59)
Unrest	-.001** (.000)	-.00 (.00)
Experience FE	Yes	Yes
Num. Obs.	77	94
R2	.30	.27
Estimation	OLS	OLS

Source: Dataset\_Figueroa.

Note: The sample excludes MCs who were absent in all sessions, including the day of the nominal vote, and also those who died before the first election. (Robust standard errors in parentheses). \*p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. The source of Landholding Inequality and Urbanization is the Third National Census (1914). Data on Unrest comes from Godio (2000).

**Table A2.** Excludes MCs who opposed the reform

	Model C Correct (Excludes abstentions)	Model D Correct (Abstention = yes)
Log distance	-.02 (.01)	-.04*** (.01)
(Avg) Absent	-1.5*** (.20)	-.89*** (.19)
Log Distance X (Avg) Absent	.17** (.06)	.15*** (.03)
N	46	63
R2	.07	.08
Estimation	OLS	OLS

Source: Dataset\_Figueroa.

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the provincial level in parentheses. The sample only includes MCs who *supported* the electoral reform.

\*p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01